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Election-oriented elites are expected to give campaign emphasis to issues on which 
their party possesses ‘issue ownership’. This paper extends those theories to the 
content of executive and legislative agendas. Arguing that executives have incentives to 
pursue their party's owned issues in the legislature, we theorize three conditions under 
which these incentives are constrained: when governments are responsive to issues 
prioritized by the public, when a party has a stronger electoral mandate, and under 
conditions of divided government. The theory is tested using time series analyses of 
policy agendas of US Statutes of Congress and the State of the Union address (1947-
2012) and UK Acts of Parliament and the Queen's Speech (1950-2010). The results 
offer support for our theory, and they are particularly strong for the US State of the 
Union address, providing insights into institutional differences. The implications 
provide reassurance concerning the conditions under which governments focus 
attention only on their partisan issue priorities.  
 
There is an extensive literature predicting the issue agendas of parties and candidates during 
election campaigns. Election-oriented elites attempt to emphasize issues on which their party has 
‘issue ownership’ (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003) and avoid issues on which another party 
has an advantage. Parties are not wholly free to achieve this 'selective emphasis' (Budge and 
Farlie 1977; 1983; Budge et al. 1987; Budge 1993). The issue agenda of an election campaign is a 
matter for competition between rivals, as well as the wider campaign context of media attention, 
policy events and what voters already care most about and decide upon. But insofar as a party's 
owned issues (the issue associations voters hold about different political parties and their 
reputation for trust and competence) overlap with their partisan priorities - those issues on 
which elites, members and activists care most about (Egan 2013) - a party that achieves its goal 
of winning office should try to pursue the party's owned issues in the legislature. A governing 
period is precisely the time when Petrocik (1996; Petrocik et al. 2013) expects a party to 
demonstrate its ownership of issues via legislative attention and commitment.  
 Issue ownership evaluations have been found to shape the issues focused upon in 
presidential rhetoric (Holian 2004; Cummins 2010), in parliamentary debate (Green-Pedersen 
and Mortensen 2010; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011), by individual Congressmen/women 
(Sulkin, 2005; 2009) and in congressional legislative outputs (Egan 2013). But there is much we 
do not know about the transmission of owned issues into legislative priorities. For one, we 
remain uncertain about the extent to which executives and political parties focus on their owned 
issues in legislation. Is this a small effect that can be outweighed by other factors, or does it 
account for a large amount of variation in executive and legislative attention? We lack 
information on whether there is a greater impact of issue ownership on executive speeches or 
whether issue ownership effects are equally strong in legislation, which is of course subject to the 
constraints of institutional competitors and legislative process. And we do not know whether 
these incentives are generalisable across country and institutional setting.2 There is also a 
significant theory gap relating to the conditions under which issue ownership executive and 
legislative incentives do not apply. After all, governing implies responsiveness to policy problems 
and issues of broad public concern (Baumgartner and Jones 2004; Jones et al. 2009; Chaqués 
Bonafont and Palau 2011), rather than to the issues that advantage one particular party. If it were 
not so, the broad argument that executives and legislatures are governed by their owned issues, 
or partisan priorities, would pose a significant challenge to a notion of political representation 
that denotes responsiveness beyond partisan priorities to the wider electorate.  
 This paper considers the effects of public opinion about party issue competence or 
ownership on executive and legislative agendas from a reverse perspective. We ask the question, 
when is it not possible for political elites to focus executive and legislative attention on partisan 
issue priorities; on a party’s best-rated issues? Given what we know about countervailing 
legislative and executive pressures to respond to issues of public concern and to work within 
ever-present political and institutional constraints (Jones 2001; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 
Adler and Wilkerson 2012), we advance a theory which incorporates competing political 
incentives. We reveal how the issue context and how the political and institutional context 
condition executive and legislative attention to policy issues on the basis of ratings of issue 
ownership. We extend the theory and analysis across two institutional systems - one presidential 
and one parliamentary (the US and the UK) and across executive and legislative agendas. The 
analysis also contributes to existing research via the creation of measures of issue competence on 
                                                 
2 Green-Pedersen and Mortensen's (2010) study of the ‘party system agenda’ represents the only 
relevant comparative study of which we are aware. This interesting contribution reveals the 
relevance of issue ownership to a legislative setting in parliamentary systems (Denmark), but not 
to policy outputs or executive priorities directly.    
multiple policy categories,3 providing an assessment of ownership and/or competence effects 
across the policy agenda. We recognise that issue ownership comprises two components; one 
that relates to the idea of commitment and association, where “party constituency ownership of 
an issue is much more long-term (although it can change and occasionally exhibits fluctuation)" 
(Petrocik 1996: 827), and the other to performance or "a “lease” – short-term ownership – of a 
performance issue" (Petrocik 1996: 827). Both aspects of public opinion about party 
competence, or ownership, create incentives to focus on a party's 'best' issues. We measure a 
party's 'best' issues using a novel rank issue measure which combines long-term and relatively 
short-term notions of issue ratings.  
 The findings reveal that issue ownership is an important explanatory factor in governing 
policy agendas in the US and in the UK. Issue ownership is particularly influential upon the issue 
agenda of the US State of the Union address, and stronger in the US. While data do not exist to 
compare a greater number of countries, the results suggest that a focus upon greater issue 
control and greater partisan influence under presidentialism may be in evidence, compared to the 
weaker evidence in the UK parliamentary system.  
 Our theory of the conditionality of issue ownership effects is supported.  The effects of 
issue competence on executive and legislative agendas are outweighed by salient policy issues, 
and they are also outweighed when the incumbent party is riding higher in the polls. We theorize 
that an owned issue agenda is more likely when a party has only its relatively strong or beneficial 
issues to demonstrate a relative electoral advantage, and when the party faces heightened 
pressure from its base. More popular incumbents can advance onto a broader issue agenda, in 
addition to issues the party owns. Support for this theoretical prediction holds important 
consequences for the abilities of popular parties to further build on their success, but for 
                                                 
3 We provide information on the robustness of results across measures of issue competence, 
given different possible operationalisations of the concepts of competence and ownership.  
unpopular parties to be forced to make an appeal to their base (see Green 2011). Finally, we 
reveal how parties' reputations on issues have weaker explanatory power under divided US 
government. Divided government also weakens the conditional relationship between public issue 
salience and issue ownership. These combined contributions add to literature on the general 
effects of divided government on legislative outcomes and agendas (Kelly 1993; Edwards et al. 
1997; Coleman, 1999; Binder 1999; Howell et al. 2000; Cohen 2012; Egan 2013).  
 
Issue Ownership and Executive and Legislative Agendas 
The issue ownership theory of elections (see Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003) provides a 
widely accepted narrative to explain candidate and party issue emphasis in campaigns. Also 
known as saliency or selective emphasis theory (Budge and Farlie 1977; 1983; Budge et al. 1987; 
Budge 1993), and consistent with Riker's (1993) dominance-dispersion principle, issue ownership 
theories predict that parties win votes (and presidents gain support, see Holian 2006), by 
emphasizing issues on which they have greatest public trust, association, and a reputation for 
competence.   
Scholars have debated the degree to which selective issue emphasis occurs (Simon 2002; 
Sigelman and Buell 2004; Holian 2004; Damore 2004; 2005; Kaplan et al. 2006; Sides 2006), 
whether ownership strategies are successful (Norporth and Buchanan 1992), and whether 
ownership campaign strategies can always be adopted in place of a focus on salient issues 
(Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Bélanger and Meguid 2008). 
However, the empirical contribution and explanatory power of these evaluations on party and 
candidate issue strategies has made the theory foremost in agenda-based accounts of vote-
seeking party, president and candidate campaign-related behavior.  
 The concept of issue ownership has been translated into the executive and legislative 
domain, although in only a handful of cases. Holian (2004) analyzed presidential remarks in 
public and Congressional hearings, identifying how a president is able to use issue framing and 
rhetoric to neutralize an opponent's ownership of an issue and gain a relative issue advantage. 
Sulkin (2005) revealed how individual Congressmen/women take up issues in Congress to 
neutralize an opponent’s issue advantage. These studies demonstrate how elites use a period in 
office to compete on issues their party does not own, trespassing onto an opponent's issues. 
 Cummins (2010) used issue ownership expectations to explain the president's issue 
agenda. In this case, the finding is that presidents promote party-owned issues in the State of the 
Union address, especially when conditions are less favorable to the president's agenda. In 
comparative work applying the concept of issue ownership to collective legislative agendas, 
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) analyze the content of parliamentary speeches and 
motions, finding party issue emphasis of owned issues. Egan (2013) identifies an effect of 
incumbent party issue ownership upon legislative outputs in Congress, demonstrating 
correspondence between 'partisan priorities' and the issues given legislative attention.4 These 
studies find that elites will use a period of office to focus on their party's own issues.  
 The existing evidence raises a number of questions. We need to further examine whether 
elites use a period in office to focus on their parties own issues or indeed whether the incentive 
is stronger to focus on issues a party does not own. We need to better answer the obvious and 
yet unanswered question concerning the extent to which parties, governments and presidents are 
able to shape the issue agenda to issues on which they have an advantage, and the extent to 
which this occurs across executive and legislative agendas. We further need to understand the 
extent to which issue ownership incentives are confined to the US context. A president may have 
particular incentives to be associated with the party's owned issues, and the polarized partisan 
                                                 
4 Note that these claims do not bear upon whether an incumbent party (the party of the 
President) achieves the policies closest to its ideal point, but to the focus of the legislative 
institution on policy priorities. Egan (2013) reveals that voters do not necessarily agree more 
with a party on its owned issues; they simply associate the party with a commitment to them. 
nature of US politics in recent decades may condition the basis for strong issue associations in 
the minds of voters towards parties. Moreover, existing studies imply that issue ownership 
incentives may be conditional on a number of factors. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) 
highlight how the incumbent party will be particularly constrained by the need to respond to 
salient policy problems. Cummins (2010) highlights the relevance of unified and divided 
government on the incentives for a president to focus his State of the Union address on issues 
that appeal to co-partisans. Egan (2013), in his definition of issue ownership, reveals how the 
party base and party elites prioritize the issues the public come to associate the party with; the 
issues a party owns. The partisan context may therefore condition the relevance of issue 
ownership explanations on executive and legislative agendas.  
 
A Contextual Theory of How Party Issue Reputations Influence Policy Agendas 
Our starting point is to state the expectation that parties' reputations on issues will, in general, 
exert an effect on the issues given priority in executive and legislative agendas. There are three 
reasons. First, election-oriented parties and presidents will try to gain ownership of issues, retain 
ownership of issues, and focus public and media attention on issues which advantage their 
electoral position via a period in office. This implies that incumbents predominantly give greater 
attention to issues on which they are more positively rated – whether via short term associations 
as parties come to have a temporary advantage on an issue, either via competition for ownership 
or via performance on specific issues, or via long-term reputations for issue ownership. Second, 
ownership of an issue assumes a long-standing party commitment to that issue; hence owned 
issues are associated with 'partisan priorities' (Egan 2013). We should expect policy-seeking 
politicians to advance issues on which they have a long-standing commitment and interest, and 
therefore for that long-standing commitment to be demonstrated in office. Third, we know that 
parliamentary parties; (a) tend to focus on party owned issues in manifestos and campaigns, at 
least to some degree, and (b) deliver the priorities of their manifestos in policy programs in 
government (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Hofferbert and Budge 1992; McDonald et al. 2004; 
McDonald and Budge 2005). We therefore hypothesize issue ownership effects as follows.  
H1: Executive and legislative policy agendas will be predicted by issue ownership – measured by public 
ratings of executive and legislature party issue competence. 
We also note that issue ownership evaluations may arise from legislative attention over the 
longer term (see Green and Jennings, forthcoming). For now, our focus is on the shorter term 
effects of issue ownership upon legislative attention. 
Our theory also hypothesizes limits on the contexts under which hypothesis 1 will hold. 
 Election campaigns themes and agendas are decided with electoral incentives at the 
forefront. However, the business of government is about responding to policy issues and 
problems; those concerns ranked most highly salient among the wider public (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2004; Jones et al. 2009). Government, presidential and legislative incentives differ from 
party or candidate election incentives. A government, president and legislative party responds to 
calls from pressure groups, party coalitions, media and public opinion, and must respond to the 
wider policy environment in the form of perceived deterioration (or otherwise) in public services, 
and economic and foreign policy 'events' (Cohen 1999; Karol 2009). Yet government and 
legislative attention is scarce because policy priorities require considerable legislative attention 
and time (Jones 2001; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Adler and Wilkerson 2012). Policy-makers 
must therefore allocate attention to issues selectively, such that incentives to attend to a party’s 
owned issues must be considered alongside incentives to attend to salient policy issues and 
problems. Given the influence of issue salience on government attention, we hypothesize that 
changes in issue salience, most often due to exogenous shifts in problem status (e.g. Hibbs 1979; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993), should trump electoral considerations and a party's long-standing 
priorities. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the effect of issue ownership on policy agendas will, ceteris 
paribus, be weakened when the explanatory power of issue salience is heightened.  
H2: The effects of issue competence evaluations on executive and legislative policy agendas will be 
attenuated by the salience of policy issues. 
 If incentives exist because political elites wish to prime and highlight areas of party policy 
strength (Sulkin 2005; 2009), these incentives should be greater when stronger electoral pressures 
on the incumbent exist; that is, when party popularity is low. When a party loses popular 
support, its owned issues represent its remaining issue advantages, forcing it to compete on a 
relatively narrow set of owned issues (Green 2011). When popularity is high, incumbents 
trespass onto an opponent's issue or issues, convincing the electorate of their superior handling 
abilities and potential ‘ownership’ via presidential persuasion and rhetorical tools (Holian 2004). 
There will still be a focus on owned issues for popular incumbents, but the issue agenda should 
be broader. A party's owned issues are those which the party elite and the party's voters consider 
most consistently important (Egan 2013). We therefore posit that an issue competence focus will 
be more likely when a party is forced back onto its electoral base, during periods of relatively low 
popularity. Such incentives may be reinforced due to an increased need for co-partisan support 
for legislation: legislators will support a party’s policy agenda more readily on issues those 
legislators deem most important. This leads us to hypothesis 3(a).  
H3a: The effects of issue competence evaluations on executive/legislative policy agendas will be attenuated 
by the electoral popularity of the incumbent/majority party. 
There is also a body of research which would point in the opposite direction. This research 
suggests that popular presidents, for example, feel less pressure to cater to public opinion (Hibbs 
1987; Hicks 1984; Manza and Cook 2002). In this case incumbents may use periods of increased 
electoral popularity to focus greater and more narrow attention on those issues they care most 
about – those issues the party owns. In this case, we alternatively consider that competence 
effects can be enhanced when party popularity is high.5 We consider both hypotheses 3(a) and 
3(b) in light of these countervailing expectations. 
H3b: The effects of issue competence evaluations on executive/legislative policy agendas will be increased 
the higher the electoral popularity of the incumbent/majority party. 
 The issue ownership theory of Petrocik (1996) expects parties to do better when their 
owned issues are salient. We therefore recognize that popularity at t-1 may be partly a product of 
ownership and salience at t-2.  
The US institutional system will place a further constraint on the translation of an 
incumbent party's issue priorities; the presence of divided government (Egan 2013). Scholars 
demonstrate significant effects of divided government on the passing of fewer agenda items 
(Binder 1999), on un-passed laws, on laws without presidential backing (Edwards et al. 1997), on 
reduced quantities of significant enactments and weaker responsiveness to the public mood 
(Coleman 1999). Congressional party fortunes are tied to a president’s successful policy agenda 
(Lebo and O’Geen 2011) and to the party’s collective reputation, established through legislative 
victories (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005). We therefore expect divided government to weaken 
the transmission of a president's party's owned issues into the policy agenda, resulting in a 
weaker effect of issue competence evaluations (hypothesis 1). Such effects should be stronger 
with respect to the legislative agenda, but presidents may also anticipate these constraints and 
moderate their executive speeches. We therefore specify H4 to the policy agenda in general.   
H4: The effects of issue competence evaluations on policy agendas will be weaker under periods of divided 
government. 
                                                 
5 We also note the Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) hypothesis that policy spending responsiveness is 
lowest when popularity is low or high but greatest at average popularity levels (also Canes-Wrone 
and Shotts 2004), suggesting that issue salience responsiveness should vary non-monotonically.  
 It should also hold that the trade-off between issue salience and issue competence (either 
in the direction of H3a or H3b) should be weaker under divided government. A divided 
government is less able to achieve its policy goals overall. A majority Congressional party may 
share the incentives of a president to be responsive to high salience public concerns, but parties 
can share priorities but differ on their ideal policy positions, which may result in heightened 
chances of gridlock on salient issues. The transmission of issues into legislation will therefore be 
stronger when the House and presidency are unified than when government is divided, 
consistent with findings of lower responsiveness to public opinion under divided government 
(Coleman 1999) and the pursuit of narrower agendas by incumbent parties and presidents 
(Coleman 1999; Howell et al. 2000; Cohen 2012).  
H5: The attenuating relationship between issue ownership and salience will be weaker under divided 
government. 
 
Data and Measures 
We examine our hypotheses in two countries and in two different institutional arenas; for the 
executive and the legislature in the US and in the UK, where powers are fused. We expect 
differences across institutions to give rise to variation in the strength of issue ownership effects.  
 The State of the Union address is a high profile vehicle for communicating the 
president’s agenda (Light 1982), subject to relatively few institutional constraints, or ‘friction’ 
(Jones et al. 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005), that limit the issues a President can attend to – 
although presidents can incur costs from talking about policy issues (Cohen 1997). The address 
is a major set piece event of the political calendar providing incentives for the emphasis of 
partisan-owned issues, while its format offers relative scope for short-term responses to 
increases (or decreases) in the salience of issues. We therefore expect strong issue ownership 
effects on the State of the Union address, stronger than on congressional legislation, and also 
strong attenuating effects of issue salience, and of popularity.  
 In the US law-making requires cooperation between both houses of Congress and the 
president; imposing higher decision costs (Jones et al. 2003), even in situations of unified control 
of government. This need for cooperation is likely to mitigate emphasis on partisan priorities, 
and may to a lesser extent limit responsiveness to the salience of issues to the public. Pressures 
of electoral competition on representatives might lead to equally strong levels of sensitivity to 
popularity as we would expect from electoral incentives upon the State of the Union address.  
The UK’s parliamentary system might be expected to give rise to fewer party issue 
ownership incentives. The fusion of legislative and executive powers means that governing 
parties face fewer constraints due to institutional friction on the issues they can attend to, but at 
the same time are insulated from electoral pressures which might otherwise create incentives for 
emphasis of party issue strengths. It also reduces the propensity for law-makers to be responsive 
in the short-term to changes in issue salience or popularity.  
 We test our hypotheses in the UK using Acts of Parliament and the content of the 
Speech from the Throne (the Queen's Speech), and in the US using data on major legislation of 
US Congress and the content of the State of the Union address.6 Data on policy attention are 
from the US Policy Agendas Project and its UK counterpart.7 They range from 1950 to 2010 in 
the UK and from 1947 to 2012 in the US. Each piece of legislation is coded with a single topic, 
indicating the primary focus of the legislation, and the observed time point is the date upon 
which the act or the bill was signed into law. The dependent variables can take a value between 
0% and 100%. For the US, legislation is weighted according to its importance, using a measure 
of “most important laws” based on the amount of coverage received in the Congressional Quarterly 
                                                 
6 In robustness tests we also use US data on Congressional hearings, Executive Orders and 
Congressional Bills.  
7 www.policyagendas.org and www.policyagendas.org.uk 
Almanac (following Adler and Wilkerson 2012).8 We use this weighting to avoid any over-
estimation of divided government effects but this adjustment is not required in the UK (where 
the dependent variable represents major legislation of government and minor legislation tending 
to be enacted through statutory instruments). The contents of the State of the Union address 
and the Queen’s Speech are divided into ‘quasi-sentences’; expressions of a single policy idea or 
issue (commonly used in analysis of executive speeches, e.g. Mortensen et al. 2011). The unit of 
analysis is therefore the proportion of each speech allocated to a particular topic (the economy, 
minorities and rights, health, labor, employment and immigration, education, environment, law 
and order, welfare and housing, defense, foreign affairs, or government). Issue categories are 
combined to match topics with our dataset on public evaluations of competence, and to make 
these comparable across countries.9 While data on policy agendas are available in many other 
countries, the survey data on public opinion about party competence are only available for 
sufficient issue categories and over a long enough time period for the US and UK, providing a 
unique opportunity to examine these variables over repeated electoral and legislative cycles.  
We gathered responses to over 8,000 survey items about party competence to handle 
particular issues or policy problems. The data consist of 5,098 administrations of 1,297 different 
questions by fifty-eight polling organizations in the US, and 2,922 administrations of 170 
different questions by six polling organizations in the UK. In the US the question wording often 
asks which party the public ‘trust to do a better job of handling’ a given issue, while in the UK 
the wording tends to focus on the party that is ‘best able to handle’ defined issues or problems.10 
                                                 
8 This simply weights each law by the number of lines of coverage it receives in the Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac (divided by the overall number of lines of coverage in a given year). This means 
that salient/landmark legislation is not treated in the same way as minor procedural law-making. 
9 The issue categories are summarized in Tables A1 and A3 of the online appendix. 
10 Examples are provided in the online appendix. 
The data are categorized into the same eleven policy categories as for the dependent variables.11 
Most questions require respondents to choose between specified political parties: typically 
between the Republican and Democratic Party in the US with the option of a non-response 
(‘none’ or ‘don’t know’). In the UK the options tend to be Labour, the Conservatives and the 
Liberals/Liberal Democrats. We drop responses for the third and other parties and non-
responses and calculate issue competence scores as the percentage of the two-party share. Issue 
competence is based in the US on evaluations of the president’s party (for the executive agenda) 
or of the majority party in the House (for the legislative agenda). We take all available 
observations for each of the eleven topics for the previous election cycle.12 Using the current cycle 
could violate the temporal ordering of the variables (with some of the issue ownership ratings 
observed prior to the policy agenda and some observed after) and could also lead to endogeneity. 
Taking the average issue competence score across the previous election cycle also ensures our 
measure of ownership is less sensitive to sparse/missing data in some periods.  
Our measure of party competence captures the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
incumbent party across the eleven policy categories; which issues a party is best on relative to 
other issues, according to the level of public confidence in the incumbent party on each issue. 
We take the ranking of each issue from one to eleven using the mean level of competence for 
                                                 
11 All data from this project are available on our website, which includes all replication materials 
for this paper [insert web address here]. There are missing data for some categories in some 
periods due to the discontinuous nature of survey data. An average of 7.9 issue categories is used 
in the US per election cycle and 7.2 in the UK. Observations with missing values are omitted in 
the reported analyses, and data falling into an ‘other’ category are also excluded. 
12 For the US, the ‘electoral cycle’ refers to each four-year presidential term for the executive 
agenda and the two-year congressional term for the legislative agenda. For the UK, this covers 
the time period between general elections.   
each issue to determine which issue is rated best relative to another, in each electoral cycle. This 
rank measure is distinctive in the field of issue ownership literature, which tends to take the 
mean rating of a party on an issue, or the lead of one party over another on an issue, or the mean 
rating of a party on an issue subtracting the party’s overall popularity. The rank measure reflects 
four conceptually-based operationalisation decisions: (i) It is less sensitive to parties’ gains or 
losses in popularity than most traditional measures. If a party gains or loses popularity, its overall 
competence on every issue rises and falls (Green and Jennings 2012). (ii) The possibility of 
variance in public opinion about issues. We argue that elites focus on issues to gain ownership, 
to reflect changes in evaluations on performance (which benefit them electorally), and to reflect 
long-standing partisan priorities. We therefore use a measure that captures change in issue 
evaluations, as well as over-time strengths on owned issues, concepts both captured in Petrocik's 
(1996) definition of issue ownership. (iii) The need to explain relative issue attention using 
relative issue-evaluations. The ordering of a party's best issues and worst issues will provide the 
most meaningful explanation of the relative ordering, or prioritisation, of issues by the executive 
or legislature. (iv) The need to estimate the effects of ownership across issues, rather than on an 
issue-by-issue basis. The measure is coded between 12-k and 11, where k is the total number of 
topics on which competence evaluations are available during a given election cycle and where 
‘11’ refers to the top-ranked issue and ‘1’ to the lowest ranked. We provide additional support 
for our theory using alternative measures of issue competence in robustness checks, although, as 
expected, the results are less consistent across each of the analysed cases. They are equally 
consistent in our analysis of the State of the Union address. 
 The salience of policy issues is measured using aggregate data on public responses to the 
survey question about the ‘most important problem’ (MIP),13 available between 1947 and 2012 in 
the US and between 1950 and 2010 in the UK. Responses are standardized for each survey to 
total 100% and then averaged across the calendar year where multiple surveys are available (see 
Feeley et al. 2006; Jennings and Wlezien 2011). 
 Popular support for the governing party is measured using data on vote intentions for 
each country by calendar year. A dataset of 3,464 polls from national surveys on vote intention is 
used in the UK for the period between 1945 and 2010, where respondents were asked which 
party they would vote ‘if the election were held tomorrow’ (Wlezien et al. 2012). We use support 
for the president’s party or the majority Congressional party in the generic congressional ballot in 
the US consisting of 1,997 polls from 1942 (Wlezien and Erikson 2002; Bafumi et al. 2010), 
supplemented with data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research’s iPoll databank.  
 The measure of divided government in the US is coded 1 if the presidency and House 
are controlled by a different party and 0 if they are controlled by the same party.14  
 
Method of analysis 
Time series cross-sectional first order autoregressive, AR(1), models are estimated for all issue 
categories (i.e. panels) for each country and policy agenda. These panels consist of the eleven 
issues categories for the US executive (the State of the Union address) and then the legislature 
(most important laws). In the UK the panels consist of eleven issue categories for the legislative 
                                                 
13 Data for Gallup’s “most important problem” question is not available in the UK after 2001 so 
we use Ipsos-MORI “most important issue” (MII) data, enabling a continuous measure of issue 
salience given common variation of the measures (see Jennings and Wlezien 2011).  
14 We also tested alternative measures of divided government, where the presidency and the 
Senate or the House are controlled by a different party, finding the same substantive results.  
agenda (Acts of UK Parliament) and for the executive agenda (the Queen’s Speech). The models 












+ β*8 DIVIDEDt*SALIENCEit*OWNERSHIPit-c 
+ γ*ELECTION CYCLEitj      (1)
 
 
Where AGENDAit refers to the proportion of the policy agenda assigned to a given issue i at 
time t, α*0 represents the intercept, OWNERSHIPit-c refers to issue competence ranking in the 
previous electoral cycle (hence t-c, not t-1), SALIENCEit refers to the percentage of respondents 
assigning each issue as the most important in the current period, and POPULARITYt refers to 
the share of popular support for the governing party, also at time t.16 For the US policy agenda 
                                                 
15 The dependent variable (i.e. the executive and legislative agendas in the US and executive and 
legislative agenda in the UK) was tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
This led to rejection of the presence of unit root at the 95 per cent confidence level. Data are 
therefore modelled in level form rather than in first differences.  
16
 The lagged model tests the effect of issue ownership rating in the previous electoral cycle t-c on 
the policy agenda at t. It is also possible that the agenda at t-1 affects ownership at t. We test for 
an effect in the reverse direction, treating ownership in the next electoral cycle as the dependent 
variable, but this produces much weaker results in terms of statistical significance and model fit. 
The above model implies that a party that has recently gained a high ranking of an issue - 
perhaps by trespassing - will be more likely to attend to the issue at time t. A party may continue 
DIVIDEDt, is also interacted with SALIENCEit and OWNERSHIPit-c. We include time-fixed 
effects by election cycle j, to control for election period variation in parties’ competence ratings 
across time. The models including DIVIDEDt are presented with and without time period 
effects due to covariance between some of these periods and the DIVIDEDt variable.  
 The model is estimated with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) which 
controls for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlations of the errors. It is fitted 
with the Prais-Winsten method to test for serial autocorrelation (μit), with the rho estimated 
separately for each panel as the first-order autoregressive process: μit = ρμit-1 + εit. This allows the 
rate of persistence to vary across units (i.e. panels), consistent with the expectation that there will 
be greater stability in the attention of policy-makers to some issues compared to others.17 
Results: US 
The results are presented first for the policy agenda of the State of the Union address. Model 1 
includes the results for the main effects of issue ownership and salience. Model 2 includes the 
results for the interactions relating to H2 (the salience moderation hypothesis) and H3 (the 
popularity moderation hypothesis), and model 3 addresses the interactions pertaining to H4 and 
H5 (the divided government hypotheses). Model 4 includes the full model but omits the election 
cycle dummies for comparison.18  
Table 1 about here 
                                                                                                                                                        
to focus on an issue it has recently gained an advantage upon, but it could also be less likely to 
do so. The model will not account, obviously, for all instances, but we note that successful 
trespassing is relatively rare. 
17 The models were also estimated using an autoregressive distributed lag framework and without 
panel-corrected standard errors. These led to the same conclusions. 
18 Models with and without all election dummies are reported in supplementary appendices. 
Table 1 reveals support for hypothesis 1: differences in issue competence evaluations for a 
president’s party predict the policy attention of the president in the State of the Union address. 
The main effect of issue competence is significant in all four models and the addition of 
additional variables enhances the effect of issue competence on the policy agenda of executive 
speeches. In terms of substantive interpretation, a rank increase of one-point leads to an increase 
of 5.43 percentage points in executive attention to the issue, in model 3. The lowest ranked issue, 
on average, receives 54.3 percentage points less attention than the highest ranked issue (5.43 * 
(11-1)). The main effects of issue salience are also significant in each model, consistent with 
Baumgartner and Jones (2004) and Jones et al. (2009), who reveal that the president’s policy 
agenda is responsive to issues of public concern. 
 Table 1 also reveals support for hypothesis 2 which predicted that the effects of issue 
competence would be moderated by issue salience. The term SALIENCEit*OWNERSHIPit-c is 
negative and significant when entered into model 2, and remains significant when additional 
variables are included in the equation in model 3 (also when the time fixed effects are removed 
in model 4). The following Figure 1(a) displays the marginal effect of issue competence rank over 
values of issue salience (model 3).  
Figure 1(a) about here 
The slope in Figure 2(a) indicates a drop in effect size from around 5.0 to just less than 3.0 
(where confidence interval values do not cross zero) and a significant effect of relative issue 
competence when values of issue salience are between 0 and 27. As issues become more salient, 
the explanatory power of issue competence is removed, but issue competence effects are 
significant at low values of issue salience. Reversing the x and y axis (not shown in Figure 2a), 
the effect of issue salience is removed when parties are ranked highest on policy issues. These 
relationships support the theorised relationship: there is a trade off between whether incumbents 
emphasize their own issues, or whether they emphasize salient issues. 
 We hypothesized two further conditions under which relative issue competence 
evaluations would be weaker; when electoral popularity is higher (H3a), or conversely lower 
(H3b), and under conditions of divided government (H4). Models 2, 3 and 4 address these 
hypotheses. The results in all three models support hypothesis 3(a) rather than hypothesis 3(b). 
The significant and negative relationship on the OWNERSHIPit-c*POPULARITYt interaction 
reveals that the effects of issue competence are weaker when electoral popularity is higher. This 
relationship is demonstrated using marginal effects (based on model 3) in Figure 1(b).   
Figure 1(b) about here 
Figure 2(b) demonstrates a substantial drop in issue competence effect size as party popularity 
increases, crossing zero at around 50% in vote intention share.19 The president is more likely to 
attend to owned issues in the State of the Union address when his party faces a weaker position 
in the polls, but relative issue competence has no effect when the party is more popular. Issue 
ownership incentives disappear at higher levels of electoral support.  
 Model 3 in Table 1 suggests some tentative support for hypothesis 4 which predicted 
that the effects of issue competence will be weaker under divided government. The coefficient 
for the OWNERSHIPitc*DIVIDEDt interaction is negative in direction and just misses 
significance at the 90% level (p=0.12). These results indicate that divided government does not 
significantly reduce the tendency of presidents to focus attention on their owned issues, although 
there is some suggestion of an effect in the expected direction. However, it is interesting to 
observe the moderating effect of divided government on issue salience effects on executive 
speeches, which suggests that presidents may avoid high salience issues because they cannot 
expect policy successes on those issues, or because those issues become salient due to policy 
problems and attributable failings – more likely under divided government than when 
government is unified – which a president would rather not bring attention to.  
                                                 
19 We confine the range of the X axis to the minimum and maximum values. 
 Our final hypothesis (H5) predicted that the relationship between issue salience and 
competence would be weaker under divided government. The significant three-way interaction in 
the final row of Table 1, in models 3 and 4, supports this hypothesis. Further examination of the 
marginal effects for SALIENCEit*OWNERSHIPitc when DIVIDEDt = 0 or 1 (not displayed) 
reveals that the relationship between salience and competence is weaker when the House and 
presidency are divided and stronger when unified. While incentives to respond to salient issues 
will moderate a tendency of presidents to attend to their party’s owned issues, this moderating 
relationship no longer holds when the president faces a House controlled by the opposing party.  
 We next examine the hypotheses by analyzing the effects of relative issue competence 
and the hypothesized contextual relationships on the policy agenda of Congress. We argued 
earlier that it might be expected that the effects of issue competence will be stronger in executive 
speeches. The executive speech is especially partisan and it also subject to fewer institutional 
constraints and 'friction' (Jones et al. 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). However, it should 
also be true that issue competence effects remain influential in Congress due to the priority given 
to owned issues by party elites. We expect divided government to exert a stronger attenuating 
effect on the transmission of issue ownership incentives in legislation rather than in speeches.  
Table 2 about here 
The first row of Table 2 provides evidence in support of hypothesis 1. There is a significant 
effect of issue competence on the policy agenda of Most Important Laws in Congress. Evidence 
for this is found in models 2 and 3 which include election period fixed effects and the additional 
variables for party popularity (model 2) and divided government (model 3). There is a large 
increase in effect size between model 1 and model 2 as variables for party popularity and 
interactions are added. In terms of substantive interpretation, the coefficient size for issue 
competence in model 2 denotes that an increase of one-point on the issue ownership scale leads 
to an increase of 6.41 percentage points in the attention of Congress for the incumbent party.  
 Table 2 also provides support for the contextual hypotheses. Significant effects for the 
interaction term SALIENCEit*OWNERSHIPit-c are found in model 3 and model 4. The 
significant negative interaction coefficients confirm the hypothesized trade off between 
ownership effects and salience. In order to interpret this relationship, Figure 2(a) presents the 
marginal effect of issue competence across values of issue salience, based on model 3.  
Figure 2(a) about here 
Figure 2(a) reveals that issue competence evaluations exert a significant effect upon the policy 
agenda in most important laws when issues are low in salience. The confidence intervals cross 
zero at a salience score of 25, revealing a similar pattern of effects to those identified in the 
policy agenda of State of the Union speeches (in Figure 1a, above).  
 Support is also found in Table 2 for the hypothesis relating to the relationship between 
issue competence and electoral popularity (H3). Models 2 and 3 in Table 2 reveal significant 
negative effects for the OWNERSHIPit-c*POPULARITYt interaction, revealing that issue 
competence effects on Congressional legislation are weakened when the majority party’s electoral 
popularity is higher and made stronger when the majority party is weaker in the polls. This 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 2(b), which exhibits the marginal effects.  
Figure 2(b) about here 
There are very strong parallels in these effects comparing Figure 2(b) for legislation, above, and 
Figure 1(b) for executive speeches. These findings jointly reveal that electorally popular parties 
are much less influenced by the relative issue competence evaluations of the public than are 
electorally unpopular parties, giving support to hypothesis 3(a) rather than to hypothesis 3(b).  
 The remaining hypotheses predicted that issue competence effects would be weaker 
under divided government (H4), and that the moderating effect of issue salience on issue 
competence would also be weaker under divided government (H5). These hypotheses are 
supported in model 3 (H5) – and in model 3 (H4 and H5).  
 Note that the effect of divided government on attention to salient issues is strongly 
significant in Table 2, as it was in Table 1. Thus, one of the additional observations made 
possible in these analyses is that of reduced responsiveness of Congress to salient issues under 
divided government, and reduced responsiveness in executive speeches. These findings reveal 
support for existing scholarship which highlights the constraints on opinion responsiveness 
under divided government (see Coleman 1999). However, support for hypothesis 4 (relating to 
weaker issue ownership effects under divided government) is less strong across analyses of the 
two dependent variables. Our overarching measure of issue competence suggests that the general 
effect of divided or unified government is more limited. Where our evidence is strongest, 
however, it points to an effect on Congressional legislation rather than on executive speeches. 
 
Results: UK 
Here we examine the effects of issue ownership on Acts of the UK parliament, reflecting the 
legislative agenda of the UK government. We do not include variables for divided government. 
We therefore test hypothesis 1 (which predicted issue competence effects on the policy agenda), 
hypothesis 2 (which predicted the moderating effect of issue salience on issue competence 
effects) and hypothesis 3 (which predicted the moderating effect of party electoral popularity on 
issue competence effects). The results for the policy agenda of the UK government for Acts of 
Parliament are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 about here 
The results for the UK policy agenda in Acts of Parliament bear strong resemblance to those for 
the US, revealing that issue ownership incentives – and their contextual explanations – exist 
outside the US presidential context. 
 The first row of Table 3 reveals partial support for hypothesis 1. The effect of issue 
competence in model 1 is, counter to expectations, significant and negative. However, once 
governing party popularity and the interaction terms (with salience and popularity) are included, 
the coefficient for issue competence is positive and near significant in model 2 (p = 0.102), and 
positive and significant in model 3, suggesting support for hypothesis 1. Such a sign reversal can 
be indicative of multi-collinearity, and substantial correlation is observed here between each of 
the interaction terms and one of their constitutive variables.20 However, as Brambor et al. (2006, 
p. 70) point out, presence of multi-collinearity in a multiplicative interaction model may inflate 
standard errors, due to insufficient information for parameter estimation, but these standard 
errors are still “correct” (i.e. this simply reduces the likelihood of observing significant effects). 
Nevertheless, the instability of our results for UK Acts requires caution about inferences that can 
be derived (a further way to address multicollinearity is to add data, as we shall do in a moment). 
There is limited evidence, therefore, that relative issue competence evaluations of the governing 
party exert an effect on the policy agenda of Acts of Parliament.  
 The third row of Table 3 reveals more consistent support for hypothesis 2 for UK Acts. 
The effect of issue competence is moderated by the salience of issues, where the interaction term 
SALIENCEit*OWNERSHIPit-c is negative and significant, in both models 2 and 3. These results 
mirror those found in the US. The incentive to focus on the governing party's owned issues is 
weaker when the effect of responsiveness to salient issues is greater. There is also some support 
in model 3 in Table 3 for hypothesis 3(a), which predicted that issue competence effects would 
be moderated by incumbent party electoral popularity (in model 2 the effect of the interaction 
between issue competence and popularity is near significant, p=0.107). Examining the marginal 
effects (not shown), relative issue competence ratings exert a significant effect upon executive 
and legislative policy agendas when parties are electorally weaker, but effects are no longer 
significant when parties are electorally strong, just as found in the US analyses. Thus, while 
                                                 
20 Specifically, we observe a correlation that is equal to greater than 0.9 between 
SALIENCEit*OWNERSHIPit-c and SALIENCEit and between OWNERSHIPit-
c*POPULARITYt and OWNERSHIPit-c. 
incumbent parties may use a period in office to focus on their partisan priorities, those priorities 
are more likely to be associated with legislative policy agendas for electorally vulnerable parties. 
Incumbents with a larger electoral mandate may still attend in legislation to their owned issues, 
but their broader issue agenda, as well as the tendency to trespass onto other parties’ issues when 
incumbents have broad public appeal, results in weaker correspondence between issue 
competence evaluations and government policy agendas – both in the US and in the UK. 
As we noted, a further way of dealing with multicollinearity is to add data. In the UK the 
fusion of powers between the executive and the legislature means that we can also test the effect 
of issue ownership on the policy agenda set out in the Queen’s Speech in combination with Acts 
of UK Parliament. The results for this model are presented in Table 4. These provide stronger 
support for hypothesis 1. The direct effect of issue competence in model 1(the linear-additive 
model) is not significant, meaning there is no sign reversal in terms of statistical significance. 
Further, the effect of issue competence is positive and significant in models 2 and 3, indicating 
that relative issue competence evaluations of the governing party exert an effect on the policy 
agenda of government. In the aggregated model of the UK executive and legislative agenda, we 
find less support for hypothesis 2, that issue competence is moderated by the salience of issues, 
though the coefficients are signed (negatively) in the direction expected and just outside the 90 
per cent confidence level. Finally, there is much stronger support for hypothesis 3(a), that issue 
competence effects are moderated by government popularity, with negative and significant 
effects in both model 2 and 3. By adding data we observe more consistent results, though these 
still are not as strong as in the US, in particular the State of the Union address.21 
Table 4 about here 
                                                 
21 We provide results using only the data on the Queen's Speech in supplementary analyses. 
These provide support for Hypotheses 2.  
These results are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to draw cross-national parallels 
in issue competence effects on executive and legislative policy agendas.  
 UK government policy attention and US executive and legislative attention is explained 
by incumbent party issue competence rankings. Our contextual theory of issue ownership effects 
is also given support. Issue ownership effects are attenuated by the salience of issues and by the 
electoral popularity of the incumbent party. US findings bearing on institutional variation 
concerning unified and divided government also suggest that issue ownership effects – and issue 
salience effects – are stronger under unified government, as is the moderating effect of issue 
salience on issue ownership. It is both interesting and important that the results hold across the 
two country cases. Our results suggest that partisan priorities - where these are measured using 
public opinion about party reputations on issues - translate into legislation outside the US 
context. We therefore contend that similar issue ownership incentives are likely to exist across 
country and party system, but our contextual theory suggests that constraints are important.  
 However, it is also noticeable that our findings are stronger and more robust in the US 
case, and for the State of the Union address relative to Acts of US Congress. This pattern fits 
with our expectations regarding differences between political institutions. Firstly, strong results 
for the State of the Union address are consistent with its agenda-setting function, and low levels 
of institutional friction – enabling presidents both to seek to emphasize partisan issue strengths 
and react to issues of public concern. The slightly weaker results for Congressional law-making 
are consistent with the greater constraints for the majority party in passing legislation. The even 
weaker findings of issue ownership effects for the UK are also consistent with our expectations, 
which suggested that the relative absence of electoral pressure might reduce incentives to stress 
party issue strengths in the policy agenda of government, and to respond to short-term changes 
in issue salience or electoral popularity. Overall, then, the evidence indicates that issue ownership 
effects are shaped by their institutional context. 
 
Robustness (and Limits) of Results 
We argued above that a rank measure of issue ownership should be particularly useful when 
predicting the relative attention of executives and legislatures, and such a measure also minimizes 
the issue of endogeneity and shared variation in issue evaluations (Green and Jennings, 
forthcoming). However, Petrocik’s (1996) original measure took the mean ratings of parties on 
issues, and other linear measures have been used subsequently. We therefore subjected our 
theory to additional tests. The first applied a measure of relative issue strengths and weaknesses, 
akin to our rank measure of issue competence, but taking the difference of each mean 
competence evaluation by issue from the mean evaluation across all issues for each election 
period, divided by the standard deviation (a standardised interval level measure of issue 
competence). This measure should be expected to control for some of the endogeneity in issue 
competence evaluations, since the mean of all issues can fluctuate, but the relative strengths are 
recorded by standardised distance from the mean. Using this measure we found support for four 
of our hypotheses (hypotheses 1 thru 4), although without consistency across country and 
institutional context. The results were robust in analyses of the State of the Union address, 
suggesting that our theory applies most reliably to executive speeches in the US, and is not 
sensitive to measurement in this context. Second, we estimated the models using the governing 
party lead over the opposition for each issue. This found equally as strong results (if not 
stronger) for the executive agenda in the US, but no effects for the legislative agenda in the US 
and UK, perhaps reflecting the endogenous nature of the lead of one party over another. 
Together these checks give us reassurance that our theory is supported over different 
operationalisations of issue ownership, although it is not supported entirely over different 
measures of competence. The US executive arena appears to be most reliably explained across 
measures of issue ownership, although our results using the rank measure are confirmatory 
across institutional contexts. The second conclusion we therefore draw is that a rank measure of 
competence best explains the relative prioritisation of issues in different contexts. A categorical 
definition where an issue is better or worse than other issues provides strong and the most 
robust insights into executive and legislative attention. It is reassuring that a relative measure, 
computed differently, also gives support to our general theory.  
 The findings using the rank measure are robust to a very wide range of alternative 
modeling specifications and underlying data checks. For example, to determine whether the 
greater availability of survey data on issue competence in later time periods had substantive 
consequences for the findings, we restricted the models to the period between 1970 and 2012 
and the effects remained consistent. We tested whether effects could be different across periods, 
particularly before and after 1995 in the US, which marked the end of an otherwise unbroken 
period of Democratic control of the House. Those checks resulted in no differences to the main 
effects or to the conclusions drawn from other variables. We took alternative operationalizations 
of governing party popularity into account (based on the proportion of presidential and majority 
party seats in the legislature (in the House, or in the UK parliament)) and this made no 
substantive difference to the results. We used a different operationalization of divided 
government in the US where either one of the House or the Senate was controlled by a different 
party to the president. These checks resulted in the same substantive conclusions with equivalent 
model fit. The same held true when controlling for the party of the incumbent, and for 
Democrat control of the House in the US before and after 1995. We also checked for collinearity 
in our interaction models, splitting the samples into low and high salience issues, where possible, 
and into periods of united or divided government; finding support for our key findings. 
 Finally, we examined support for our theory on two alternative cases where the data were 
sparser. We used Congressional hearings as our measure of the dependent variable in the US and 
the Queen’s Speech alone as the dependent variable in the UK, finding a significant and positive 
effect of issue ownership and a significant and negative interaction of salience and issue 
ownership using Congressional hearings, and a significant negative interaction of salience and 
issue ownership using the Queen's Speech. These analyses support the importance of partisan 
priorities across a range of outcomes and the moderating constraint when issues are salient. 
  
Conclusions 
Issue ownership theories of party and candidate campaigning – specifying the tendency of 
political elites to seek to shift public attention on their ‘partisan priorities’ (Egan 2013); their 
‘owned issues’ (Budge and Farlie 1977; 1983; Budge et al. 1987; Budge 1993; Petrocik 1996; 
Petrocik et al. 2003) – account for the policy issues given greater attention in executive and 
legislative agendas. We expected that the public's relative ranking of parties’ issue ownership 
would result in a tendency to legislate on higher ranked issues for the president, the majority 
party in Congress, and for the government in a parliamentary system. These predictions were 
supported in analyses spanning six decades in the US and to a lesser extent in the UK.  
 Our contextual theory of issue ownership specified three conditions under which issue 
ownership incentives would be constrained; when political elites are responsive to issues 
prioritized by the public (salient issues), when a party has a stronger electoral mandate and is less 
constrained by issues most important to the base (its 'partisan priorities', Egan 2013), and under 
divided government in the US. The results support these hypotheses.  
 The tension between issue ownership and salience effects reveals an important trade-off 
between pursuing partisan priorities and pursuing public priorities, representing an encouraging 
democratic tension. Our contextual theory therefore has desirable normative implications in 
both countries’ institutional contexts and adds a new dimension to existing studies (Cummins 
2010; Egan 2013) of how partisan priorities shape policy agendas in the US.  
 The attenuating effect of party popularity on issue ownership explanations also reveals an 
important democratic tension; a president emphasizes the party’s owned party issues when his 
party’s electoral position is weaker, and majority legislative parties attend more to their owned 
issues in legislation when they are weaker in the polls. This is an important finding. For a popular 
party there is an additional benefit of being able to reach out on an opponent's issues, to 
potentially gain ownership of other issues (or a short-term benefit on an issue), and to appeal to 
a broad variety of issue-publics. There is a competitive and issue-based strategic advantage that 
comes with electoral popularity. An unpopular leader or incumbent party, however, cannot 
afford this luxury. Unpopular parties have to play to their base, further rendering an appeal to a 
broad constituency potentially more difficult and making it difficult to gain an advantage on new 
issues. Our findings suggest that issue trespassing findings (Holian 2004) may apply especially for 
popular parties rather than for leaders and parties already lacking strong popular appeal.  
 Finally, our theory predicted that divided US government would weaken the effects of 
issue ownership evaluations and public priorities. This institutional context was found to have 
some effect on the translation of issue ownership incentives into congressional legislation, 
providing further reassurance concerning this democratic constraint on the use of office for the 
pursuit of a party’s owned issues, although with weaker effects than found in other analysis of 
this question (Egan 2013). However, divided government significantly constrains the moderating 
effects between issue ownership and issue salience (and the direct effect of salient issues). These 
findings highlight the stated positive and negative consequences of divided government in 
tandem; the constraint on an otherwise unfettered executive in pursuing his or her partisan 
policy priorities, but the dual constraint of a divided executive and legislature in responding to 
issues of broad public concern. 
 We would like to test our theory in a greater number of country and institutional cases. 
Should new data become available, or should the analytic lens be on single-country case studies, 
future research might explore the application of these findings to different party systems, 
particularly where coalition government hinders the ability of any party to influence issue 
attention, where shared government and legislative compromise is commonplace. We would 
expect the same incentives to hold, but for the size of effects to potentially be reduced. Further 
research might also explore further the results in the US and the UK. Scholars might consider 
presidential and legislative responsiveness of an issue-by-issue basis; identifying instances where 
presidents are more responsive to salient issues under divided or unified government, and owned 
issues on which an incumbent party chooses not to place center stage in legislation. Our general 
measure of issue ownership effects does not preclude the possibility of individual exceptions; but 
it reveals how effects are observed across available institutional contexts in general. Our results 
hold over a range of operationalisations of issue ownership - a rank measure, an interval-level 
standardised measure, and a measure based on the governing party’s competence lead, but the 
results are not consistent in all contexts using the latter two measures. This caveat might lead to 
interesting questions concerning the meaning and measurement of issue competence. Our results 
are most strongly robust in the analysis of the State of the Union address, which suggests that 
this high profile salient context is particularly well-explained by issue ownership considerations, it 
also being subject to fewer institutional constraints. The results in the US are in general stronger 
than for the UK. The fusion of legislative and executive powers in the UK means that governing 
parties face fewer constraints due to institutional friction on the issues they can attend to, but at 
the same time are insulated from electoral pressures which might otherwise create incentives for 
emphasis of party issue strengths. 
 Political elites operate within a vast array of competing incentives. Those competing 
incentives; relating to public responsiveness on important and salient policy issues, and the 
competing incentive of emphasizing issues which appeal to the base (and which constitute 
remaining electoral strengths) condition the importance of issue ownership theories for 
governing agendas. Through the combination of insights of theories of attention-driven choice 
in government with theories of the role of selective emphasis, issue ownership and competence, 
there is potential for better understanding of when governments attend to their party-based 
ownership strengths and when other issues are prioritized above them. 
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Figure 2(a). Marginal Effects of Issue Ownership for values of Issue Salience in Major Legislation in 
Congress 
 




Table 1. Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the State of the 

























































    


















     R-squared 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.25 
N 510 510 510 510 
Panels 11 11 11 11 
     
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 2. Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and Most Important 

























































    


















     R-squared 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.25 
N 452 452 452 452 
Panels 11 11 11 11 
     
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 3. Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and Acts of the UK 









































    R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.11 
N 398 398 398 
Panels 11 11 11 
    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 4. Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the Queen’s Speech 









































    R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.20 
N 816 816 816 
Panels 22 22 22 
    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
On-line Appendix 1: Sample Issue Ownership Questions 
 
Q. If Britain were in economic difficulties, which party do you think could handle the problem 
best – the Conservatives or Labour? 
 
Q. I am going to read out a list of problems facing the country. Could you tell me for each of 
them which political party you personally think would handle the problem best? Pensions 
 
Q. Who do you trust to do a better job of handling the economy: the Democrats or the 
Republicans? 
 
Q. When it comes to … Ensuring a strong national defense ... which party do you think would 
do a better job--the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or both about the same? If you 
think that neither would do a good job, please just say so. 
 
 
Online Appendix 2: UK Data 
 
Table A1. Categories of survey questions on issue ownership, UK 
Topic Questions Obs. % 
1: Economy, Business & 
Trade 
Economy, business inflation, prices, interest rates, 
unemployment, exchange rates, taxation. 
1,012 34.63 
2: Rights & Minorities 
Democracy, freedom of speech, privacy, race, women’s 
rights 
99 3.39 
3: Health Health, NHS 246 8.42 
4: Labor, Employment & 
Immigration 
Strikes, labor relations, trade unions, employment, 
immigration, asylum 
298 10.20 
5: Education Education, schools 231 7.91 
6: Environment Climate change, environment, animal welfare 91 3.11 
7: Law & Order Law and order, crime, hanging 247 8.45 
8: Welfare & Housing Homelessness, housing, pensions, welfare, benefits 202 6.91 
9: Defense Defense, Iraq, nuclear weapons, terrorism 167 5.72 
10: Foreign Affairs 
European Union, Eastern European countries in the EU, 
foreign affairs 
175 5.99 
11: Government Competence, devolution, ethics 26 0.89 
12: Other 
Modernization, morality, Northern Ireland, public transport, 
unity 
128 4.38 
Total  2,922 100.00 
 
Table A2. Number of survey questions on issue ownership, UK 
Election Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
1939 – 1945 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1950 – 1951 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1951 – 1955 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 8 
1955 – 1959 12 1 1 4 0 0 1 9 4 4 0 0 36 
1959 – 1964 10 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 21 
1964 – 1966 20 2 2 8 2 0 3 8 4 6 0 1 56 
1966 – 1970 11 0 0 17 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 38 
1970 – 1974 23 0 6 12 6 0 0 0 6 7 0 1 61 
1974 – 1979 60 33 8 39 8 0 14 19 6 11 0 10 208 
1979 – 1983 46 28 6 30 9 0 18 16 12 12 0 10 187 
1983 – 1987 75 0 39 37 38 5 39 5 42 32 0 0 312 
1987 – 1992 145 23 40 15 41 21 36 48 37 37 0 23 466 
1992 – 1997 134 12 29 26 26 26 29 45 27 28 7 46 435 
1997 – 2001 74 0 11 12 10 15 11 17 10 10 7 19 196 
2001 – 2005 53 0 13 11 4 7 10 14 12 5 3 9 141 
2005 – 2010 159 0 32 27 29 17 28 10 6 2 3 2 315 
2010 – 2015 188 0 58 58 58 0 58 2 0 12 6 0 440 
 
 
Online Appendix 3: US Data 
 
Table A3. Categories of survey questions on issue ownership, US 
Topic Questions Obs. % 
1: Economy, Business & 
Trade 
Economy, spending, inflation, prices, interest rates, 
unemployment, exchange rates, taxation, national debt. 
1,374 26.95 
2: Rights & Minorities Civil rights, abortion 139 2.73 
3: Health Health, medicare, drug abuse 416 8.16 
4: Labor, Employment & 
Immigration 
Labor relations, unions, employment, immigration 289 5.67 
5: Education Education, schools 216 4.24 
6: Environment Environment, pollution 111 2.18 
7: Law & Order Law and order, crime, gun control 139 2.73 
8: Welfare & Housing Welfare, social security, benefits, pensions, housing 317 6.22 
9: Defense Defense, national security, nuclear arms 281 5.51 
10: Foreign Affairs International/foreign affairs, international terrorism 514 10.08 
11: Government Running government efficiently, managing government 254 4.98 
12: Other 
Agriculture, energy, morality, transport, science, public lands, 
other 
1,048 20.56 
Total  5,098 100.00 
  
Table A4. Number of survey questions on issue competence, US 
Election Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
 1940 – 1944     1  0      0   3    0  0    0    0   3    9    6    2     24  
1944 – 1948   34  0      1   7    1  0    0    1   2   10    5   22     83  
1948 – 1952   25  3      0   4    0  0    0    0   2    9    2   27     72  
1952 – 1956   14  2      0   0    0  0    0    0   0   11    0   14     41  
1956 – 1960   13  2      1   2    1  0    0    0   0   14    0   32     65  
1960 – 1964   13  1      0   0    0  0    0    0   0   15    1   22     52  
1964 – 1968   19  2      0   1    0  0    1    0   5   10    0   24     62  
1968 – 1972   11  0      0   0    0  0    1    0   1    7    0   14     34  
1974 – 1976    9  0      1   0    0  0    0    0   0    5    4   16     35  
1976 – 1980   34  1      1   1    1  1    1    2   1   10    4   25     82  
1980 – 1984   83 15      4  10   10 10    6   23  23   41   13   60    298  
1984 – 1988   75  7      4   8    2  4    7    9  12   35   23   61    247  
1988 – 1992  126 31     25  18   20 19   24   32  16   46   11  101    469  
1992 – 1996  144  7     62  17   19 13   40   34  10   34   36  115    531  
1996 – 2000   96 22     72   7   35 19   34   45   5   26   26  150    537  
2000 – 2004  184 12     70  32   65 23   15   96  59   71   14   82    723  
2004 – 2008  243 23     74  87   47 13    7   61 116  121   77  170  1,039  
2008 – 2012  250 11    101  92   15  9    3   14  26   40   32  111    704  
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Online Appendix 4: Policy Agendas Project Major Topic Codes 
Topic Abbreviation Policy Agendas Major Topic Codes Issue Ownership Categories 
1 Economy Macroeconomics (1) 
Economy, Business & Trade 15 Business Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce (15) 
18 Foreign Trade Foreign Trade (18) 
2 Rights  Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties (2) Rights & Minorities  
3 Health Health (3) Health 
5 Labor Labor, Employment, and Immigration (5) Labor, Employment& Immigration 
6 Education Education (6) Education 
7 Environment Environment (7) Environment 
12 Law Law, Crime, and Family Issues (12) Law & Order 
13 
Social 
Social Welfare (13) 
Welfare & Housing 
14 Community Development, Planning and Housing Issues (14) 
16 Defense Defense (16) Defense 
19 Foreign International Affairs and Foreign Aid (19) Foreign Affairs 





8 Energy (8) 
9 Morality (9) 
10 Transportation (10) 
17 Space, Science, Technology and Communications (17) 
21 Public Lands and Water Management (21) 
99 Other (99) 
Policy Agendas Topic Codebook, see www.policyagendas.org 
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Online Appendix 5: Full Models with Election Cycle Fixed Effects Displayed 
 
Table A5.Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the State of the 

























































    




















































     Election Cycle: 1972-1976 - - - - 
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     R-squared 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.25 
N 510 510 510 510 
Panels 11 11 11 11 
     
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A6.Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and Most Important 
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     Election Cycle: 2010-2012 - - - - 








     R-squared 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.25 
N 452 452 452 452 
Panels 11 11 11 11 
     
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A7.Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and Acts of the UK 





































































































    R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.11 
N 398 398 398 
Panels 11 11 11 
    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A8.Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the Queen’s 










































































































    R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.20 
N 816 816 816 
Panels 22 22 22 
    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Online Appendix 6: Analyses pertaining to ‘robustness checks’ in the manuscript 
 
Table A9.Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the State of the 
Union (President’s Party), Includes Election Cycle Fixed Effects  
 
 AGENDAit 
 Rank Standardised Lead 











































   


















    R-squared 0.28 0.25 0.25 
N 510 510 510 
Panels 11 11 11 
    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A10. Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and Most Important 
Laws (Majority Party), Includes Election Cycle Fixed Effects 
 
 AGENDAit 
 Rank Standardised Lead 











































   


















    R-squared 0.27 0.23 0.23 
N 452 450 452 
Panels 11 11 11 
    




Table A11.Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and Acts of the UK 
Parliament (Majority Party), Includes Election Cycle Fixed Effects 
 AGENDAit 
 Rank Standardised Lead 




































    R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.12 
N 398 397 398 
Panels 11 11 11 
    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A12. Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the State of the Union 




 SOTU Laws 










































   R-squared 0.23 0.28 
N 592 515 
Panels 11 11 
   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A13: Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the State of the 
Union (President’s Party) and Most Important Laws (Majority Party), Time Period 1970 to 2012  
 
 AGENDAit 
 SOTU Laws 










































   R-squared 0.43 0.32 
N 386 359 
Panels 11 11 
   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A14: Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the Queen’s Speech 
(Legislative Section of the Speech)22  
 
 AGENDAit 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 

































    R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.26 
N 408 408 408 
Panels 11 11 11 
    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
                                                 
22 We use a three-year moving average to dampen volatility in the Queen’s Speech measure, due 
to the relatively short length of these speeches. 
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Table A15.Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the State of the 
Union (President’s Party), Includes Election Cycle Fixed Effects, Low vs. High Salience (Other 
vs. Economic Issues) 
 
 AGENDAit 






























   R-squared 0.10 0.54 
N 448 62 
Panels 10 1 
   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A16. Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and Most Important 
Laws (Majority Party), Includes Election Cycle Fixed Effects, Low vs. High Salience (Other vs. 
Economic Issues) 
 AGENDAit 






























   R-squared 0.12 0.00 
N 391 61 
Panels 10 1 
   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A17. Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the Queen’s 
Speech and Acts of the UK Parliament (Majority Party), Excludes Election Cycle Fixed Effects, 
Low vs. High Salience (Other vs. Economic Issues) 
 ACTSit 




















   R-squared 0.14 0.41 
N 716 100 
Panels 22 2 
   
# p<0.15, * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A18.Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and the State of the 
































   R-squared 0.38 0.30 
N 287 223 
Panels 11 11 
   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 65 
Table A19. Time Series Cross-Sectional AR(1) Model of Issue Ownership and Most Important 































   R-squared 0.23 0.40 
N 256 196 
Panels 11 11 
   
# p<0.15; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
